The field of international relations is stronger because of its publication." -Aaron M.
Kydd's book is a model of systematic thinking about important subjects. Kydd's impressive new book speaks to a range of topics. It is a must-read for academic specialists in international relations, and also should be of interest to policymakers and Cold War historians." -Anne E. "This rigorous but accessible book is a very good choice for graduate and advanced undergraduate classes in international relations. Contrary to the common view that both sides were willing to compromise but failed because of mistrust, Kydd argues that most of the mistrust in the Cold War was justified, because the Soviets were not trustworthy. The book’s historical chapters focus on the growing mistrust at the beginning of the Cold War. Third, even states that strongly mistrust each other can reassure each other and cooperate provided they are trustworthy. Second, strong states, traditionally thought to promote cooperation, can do so only if they are relatively trustworthy. First, while trustworthy states may enter conflict, when we see conflict we should become more convinced that the states involved are untrustworthy.
Grounded in a realist tradition but arriving at conclusions very different from current realist approaches, this theory is the first systematic game theoretic approach to trust in international relations, and is also the first to explicitly consider how we as external observers should make inferences about the trustworthiness of states. In this groundbreaking book, Andrew Kydd develops a theory of trust in international relations and applies it to the Cold War. States that mistrust each other enough can wage preventive wars, attacking now in fear that the other side will attack in the future. States that trust each other can cooperate and remain at peace. The difference between war and peace can be a matter of trust.
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